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ABSTRACT 
Optimal Exchange Rate Policy in a Growing Semi-Open Economy* 
In this paper, we consider an alternative perspective to China's exchange rate 
policy. We study a semi-open economy where the private sector has no 
access to international capital markets but the central bank has full access. 
Moreover, we assume limited financial development generating a large 
demand for saving instruments by the private sector. We analyze the optimal 
exchange rate policy by modelling the central bank as a Ramsey planner. Our 
main result is that in a growth acceleration episode it is optimal to have an 
initial real depreciation of the currency combined with an accumulation of 
reserves, which is consistent with the Chinese experience. This depreciation 
is followed by an appreciation in the long run. We also show that the optimal 
exchange rate path is close to the one that would result in an economy with 
full capital mobility and no central bank intervention. 
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In recent years we have seen a heated debate on Chinese exchange rate pol-
icy and the enormous accumulation of international reserves by its central bank.
While the increase in reserves has been considered as a major contributor to global
imbalances, the renminbi (RMB) has typically been viewed as undervalued.1 For
example, Frankel (2010) clearly states \An appreciation would improve economic
welfare". However, these views are not universally shared. For example, McK-
innon (2010) gives two main arguments against more RMB exibility. First, a
exible exchange rate is not desirable given the limited international use of the
RMB. Second, an appreciation will not necessarily reduce the huge current account
surplus, unless it reduces the dierence between aggregate saving and aggregate
investment.
This paper will focus on the second argument of McKinnon, namely the con-
nection between the exchange rate level and net saving. We examine the optimal
exchange rate policy in a dynamic intertemporal model that incorporates four ba-
sic features of the Chinese economy: i) limited capital mobility; ii) a net capital
outow taking the form of an accumulation of central bank international reserves;
iii) underdeveloped nancial markets; iv) a very high growth rate. In such a con-
text the central bank is modeled as a Ramsey planner who can choose the optimal
path of the exchange rate and of international reserves. Our main result is that in a
growth acceleration episode it is optimal to have an initial real depreciation of the
currency combined with an accumulation of reserves. This depreciation is followed
by an appreciation in the long run. We also show that the optimal exchange rate
1For some recent contributions on this debate, see Cheung et al. (2011), Frankel (2010), or
Goldstein and Lardy (2008).
1path is close to the one that would result in an economy with full capital mobility
and no central bank intervention. The main reason for an optimal depreciation is
nancial underdevelopment implying a limited supply of nancial assets. With a
developed nancial system, an initial appreciation would be optimal.
Studying the link between the real exchange rate and net saving naturally
requires an intertemporal approach, in contrast to many analyses that examine
the relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance. The standard
model analyzing this link is the representative-individual innite-horizon model
with traded and non-traded goods.2 We deviate from this benchmark model to
incorporate the four features mentioned above. The combination of the rst two
features gives us a \semi-open" economy, which is an economy where the private
sector does not have access to the international capital market, but the central
bank does. In a recent paper, Jeanne (2012) considers a semi-open economy with
traded and non-traded goods and shows how exogenous changes in international
reserves alter intertemporal consumption choices, as well as the real exchange rate.
The combination of the two other features, low nancial development and high
growth rates, potentially leads to an excess demand for saving instruments. To
model this saving need, we follow Woodford (1990) and introduce heterogeneous
households who could be either borrowers or lenders. With strong credit frictions,
lenders may not be willing to lend to borrowers. Consequently, there is a lack of
nancial assets for lenders since they do not have access to international capital
markets.3 Moreover, the limited borrowing in bad times leads households to save
2See Obstfeld and Rogo, 1996, ch. 4. For example, Obstfeld and Rogo (2000, 2007) use
this standard framework to analyze US net saving and the dollar exchange rate.
3This implies that a capital account liberalization would lead to a net private capital out-
ow. Several papers in the literature predict such an outcome for China using totally dierent
perspectives. E.g., see He et al. (2012a).
2more in good times. Consequently, this simple framework with credit constraints
enables to capture two key features found in the recent literature on global im-
balances: insucient supply of domestic assets (see Caballero et al., 2008) and
precautionary saving (see Mendoza et al., 2009).
In this context of an "excess" demand for saving, or asset scarcity, the govern-
ment or the central bank can provide domestic assets to accommodate the saving
need. A natural way of changing the amount of domestic assets is for the central
bank to serve as intermediary between the international capital market and do-
mestic savers. Thus, an accumulation of international reserves at the central bank
can be translated into an increase in the supply of domestic assets and an increase
in private saving.4 This policy will also aect the real exchange rate. A higher
saving rate reduces demand and pressure on domestic prices, which implies a real
depreciation. Therefore the optimal exchange rate policy is directly tied to asset
provision and reserve policy.
To analyze the optimal exchange rate policy in the context of a semi-open
economy, we take a dynamic optimal taxation approach, by modelling the central
bank as a Ramsey planner. The central bank takes the government behavior as
given and therefore has much fewer instruments than in standard optimal taxation
analyses. Although this approach has not been used for exchange rate policy (and
even less in the Chinese context), there is growing interest in using these tools
in international macroeconomics.5 In a growth acceleration episode, we nd that
it is optimal to supply more domestic assets nanced by international reserves.
4Since 2000, the Chinese central bank has increased its liabilities with the domestic banking
sector at about the same rate as international reserves. These liabilities mainly take the form of
central bank bonds and commercial banks reserves.
5Farhi et al. (2012) show that a simple combination of taxes can replicate nominal exchange
rate policy, but they do not consider a Ramsey planner.
3Therefore it is also optimal to let the currency depreciate. We also nd that
the optimal depreciation with capital controls is close to the depreciation that
would occur in an open economy. The need for reserve accumulation and currency
depreciation will be stronger when the lack of saving instruments is acute, i.e.,
with low nancial development.
The structure of the semi-open economy is similar to Bacchetta et al. (2013),
but we consider traded and non-traded goods to determine real exchange rate
movements. In our previous paper with a single good, the optimal policy was
determined by various trade-o caused by changes in the interest rate. Indeed, in
the presence of credit constraints and growth, the role of policy is to help agents
consume more in early periods, when the constraint is more binding. This can
be achieved by either a high or a low interest rate, depending on the level of
growth, risk and credit constraint. The optimal semi-open economy then consists
in accumulating more or less reserves than the open economy. The introduction
of the real exchange rate adds an incentive to appreciate the currency in order to
stimulate income and the value of collateral in early periods, which implies that
the central bank would tend to accumulate less reserves. Our results suggest that
this either mitigates or reinforces the policy induced by the interest rate trade-os,
but does not dramatically alter optimal policy. Exchange rate dynamics is more
a consequence of reserve policy than a driver of that policy.
Our results are broadly consistent with the experience of China after it joined
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001.6 Figure 1 documents the
6We focus on the years 2000 as China was not truly a market economy until the late
nineteen-nineties. For instance, a signicant share of producer and retail prices were not market-
determined until the second half of the nineties. The People's Bank of China only became an
autonomous central bank in the modern sense after a law was passed in March 1995. See OECD
(2009) for details on the reform process.
4relevant stylized facts. First, China experienced a growth acceleration: the growth
rate of GDP per capita increased from 7% in 2001 to 14% in 2009. Second, the
central bank started accumulating large amounts of international reserves, from
16% of GDP in 2001 to almost 50% at the end of the decade. Third, over that
same period, the real eective exchange rate initially depreciated, from 2001 to
2005, before appreciating after 2005. Fourth, these dynamics coincided with an
increase in aggregate net saving as represented by the current account (from 1.3%
of GDP in 2001 to 10% in 2007), consistent with the mechanism we describe below.
A standard perspective for the last decade is that China experienced an increase
in export demand. To prevent a nominal appreciation, the central bank intervened
in the foreign exchange market and accumulated reserves. Moreoever, it sterilized
the increase in reserves to avoid ination. Our alternative perspective is that the
growth acceleration increased saving by Chinese consumers, mainly in the form of
bank deposits. The implied increase in liabilities of the Chinese banking sector
was translated into an increase in central bank liabilities, through required reserves
and central bank bills. In this context, the optimal policy of the central bank is
to purchase foreign currency assets and to let the real exchange rate depreciate.7
Thus, the central bank served as intermediary between the private sector and the
international capital market, as argued in particular by Song et al. (2011). We
notice that both the standard and our alternative approach are consistent with
the increase in international reserves and current account illustrated in Figure 1.
However, the standard perspective is not consistent with the real depreciation
7We consider a real model and do not model ination explicitly. Introducing a nominal
sector with exible prices would allow to distinguish between nominal and real exchange rate
uctuations, but would not change our main analysis. Notice, however, that the nominal trade-
weighted RMB has moved closely to its real value since 2000.
5between 2001 and 2005, as an increase in export demand should lead to a real
appreciation.
As in several recent papers, one feature of our analysis is the interaction be-
tween real exchange rate movements and a credit constraint.8 It is well known
that this feature creates pecuniary externalities through the value of the collateral
and therefore a role for policy intervention. It turns out, however, that this eect
plays little role in our context. On the other hand there is no real externality from
exchange rate movements. Korinek and Serven (2011) and Benigno and Fornaro
(2012) assume learning by doing in the export sector, which gives an incentive for
currency depreciation and reserve accumulation. In these two papers, there is a
trade-o between lower consumption today and higher productivity tomorrow. In
our model, the trade-o is between lower consumption today and higher savings
that allow higher consumption tomorrow. Even though there is no long-term pro-
ductivity gain in our model, there is a substantial welfare gain in accumulating
reserves and initially depreciating the currency.
In the following section, we lay out the model. Section 3 describes the model
equilibrium. Section 4 describes the Ramsey problem and derives several analytical
results about the optimal policy. Section 5 presents numerical simulations and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is inhabited by innitely-lived households who receive endow-
ments in traded and non-traded goods and consume both goods. The relative
8E.g., Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2011), Benigno et al. (2013). Cespedes et al. (2012) examine
central bank intervention with such an externality in the context of capital inows.
6price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods, pt, is the real exchange rate.9
Following Woodford (1990, section I), endowments alternate between low and high
levels and there are two groups of mass one of households.10 This structure im-
plies that in a given period half of households have a high endowment and typically
would like to save, while the other half have a low endowment and would like to
borrow.11 Households trade one-period local assets. Without loss of generality,
these assets are denominated in the traded good.12 There is a gross interest rate
rt (measured in traded goods) on lending and borrowing.
We assume that households do not have access to international capital mar-
kets. Therefore, high-endowment households can save either by lending to low-
endowment households or by holding central bank assets.13 However, high-
endowment households may be reluctant to lend to other households due to credit
market frictions and may thus be looking for other saving instruments.
In addition to households there is a Ramsey planner, that we call a central
bank, who can issue local assets and hold international reserves, thereby aecting
the real exchange rate. When credit constraints are tight, the opportunities to
9In general there can be dierences between the relative price of traded and non-traded goods
and the commonly measured real exchange rate. We will abstract from these dierences. He et
al. (2012b) estimate that in the case of China the relative price of traded and non-traded goods
shows a stronger appreciation in recent years than standard real exchange rates measures.
10There are four basic dierences with Woodford (1990): i) consumers may be able to borrow;
ii) there is a Ramsey planner; iii) there is no capital stock; iv) there are traded and non-traded
goods.
11This simple structure can account for three major explanations for the Chinese propensity
to save that are rooted in the lack of welfare state: income risk and the need for savings in the
perspective of health-related expenditures or retirement. Other factors can explain high saving
in China (e.g., see Yang et al., 2011), such as education or the gender imbalance, but adding
these factors would not change the main results of our analysis.
12In the absence of uncertainty, the denomination of assets has no consequence on equilibrium
allocations.
13In reality, the lending between high and low endowment households goes through the bank-
ing sector, with bank deposits and bank loans. Modeling nancial intermediaries would not aect
our analysis.
7save for high-endowment households are limited. In this case the provision of local
assets by the central bank may be desirable.
2.1 Households
At time t, a rst group of households receives an endowment of traded and
non-traded goods Y T
t and Y N
t . We denote the total resources of this rst group in
terms of traded goods by Yt = Y T
t + ptY N
t . The second group receives aY T
t and
aY N
t with 0  a < 1, so its total resources in terms of traded goods are aYt. At
t + 1, the rst group receives aY T
t+1 and aY N
t+1 while the second receives Y T
t+1 and
Y N
t+1, and so on. Thus, in each period, one group receives Y while the other group
receives aY . We refer to the group with Y as cash-rich households, or savers,
and the group with aY as cash-poor households, or borrowers. Each household
alternates between a cash-rich and a cash-poor state, and each period there is an
equally-sized population of rich and poor. Cash-rich households will hold assets
A, while cash-poor households borrow L. Households also receive a prot from the
central bank. These prots are distributed equally between the two groups so that
each household receives t=2 in traded goods at period t. Prots can be negative,
in which case households pay a lump-sum tax.
Households maximize:
1 X
s=0

su(c
T
s ;c
N
s ): (1)
We will focus on separable iso-elastic utility functions u(cT
s ;cN
s ) = v(cT
s ) + v(cN
s )
8with
v(c) =
c1 
1   
for  > 0; 6= 1
v(c) = lnc for  = 1:
We denote consumption of traded (non-traded) goods during the cash-rich period
as cAT (cAN). Consumption of traded (non-traded) goods during the cash-poor
period is denoted cLT (cLN). Consider a household that is cash-rich at time t and
cash-poor at date t + 1. Its budget constraints at t and t + 1 are:
Yt   rtLt + t=2 = c
AT
t + ptc
AN
t + At+1; (2)
aYt+1 + rt+1At+1 + t+1=2 = c
LT
t+1 + pt+1c
LN
t+1   Lt+2: (3)
The household income at date t, which is composed of endowment Yt minus debt
repayments rtLt plus central bank prots, is allocated to buying assets At+1, traded
goods cAT
t , and non-traded goods cAN
t . We will focus on sequences of endowments
such that At+1 > 0. In the following period, at t + 1, its income is composed of
the return on assets, rt+1At+1, of aYt+1 and of central bank prots. This has to
pay for consumption of traded and non-traded goods, cLT
t+1 and cLN
t+1. Typically the
cash-poor household will borrow, so that at the optimum Lt+2  0.
The cash-poor household might face a credit constraint when borrowing at date
t + 1. Due to standard moral hazard arguments, a fraction 0   < 1 of the total
endowment is used as collateral for bond repayment:
rt+2Lt+2  Yt+2: (4)
9The multiplier associated with this constraint is denoted v0(cAT
t+2)t+2.
Cash-rich households at time t satisfy the following Euler equation:
v
0(c
AT
t ) = rt+1v
0(c
LT
t+1): (5)
Similarly, poor households at date t satisfy the following Euler equation:
v
0(c
LT
t ) = rt+1v
0(c
AT
t+1)(1 + t+1): (6)
The intertemporal choice of a cash-poor household is distorted when the credit
constraint is binding, because t+1 > 0. The following slackness condition has also
to be satised:
(Yt+1   rt+1Lt+1)t+1 = 0: (7)
2.2 The Real Exchange Rate
The rst order conditions give:
pt = 
v0(cLN
t )
v0(cLT
t )
= 
v0(cAN
t )
v0(cAT
t )
: (8)
In equilibrium total non-traded consumption is equal to total non-traded endow-
ment:
c
AN
t + c
LN
t = (1 + a)Y
N
t : (9)
In this case, the rst-order conditions imply:
pt = 

cAT
t + cLT
t
(1 + a)Y N
t

: (10)
10Since this is an endowment economy, the real exchange rates simply depends
on the ratio between traded consumption and non-traded output. The evolution
of traded good consumption is obviously aected by the presence of credit con-
straints. Consider for example an increase in the growth rate of all endowments.
As we shall see, the credit constraint then implies higher saving so that cAT
t +cLT
t
increases initially less than the endowment. This implies a decline in pt and thus
a depreciation.
The depreciation in a period of strong growth is thus associated with an increase
in saving. How is this possible in the aggregate? In an open economy households
would buy foreign assets. In a semi-economy, this is possible if the central bank
issues local assets, nanced by the accumulation of reserves. Thus, as shown by
Jeanne (2012), the accumulation of reserves is directly related to saving and to the
exchange rate. In this paper we will determine the optimal exchange rate/reserves
policy.
2.3 Central Bank Policy
The central bank issues domestic assets Bt+1 at time t paying a gross interest
rate rt+1. It has access to foreign reserves B
t+1 (denominated in traded goods)
that yield the world interest rate r. We assume that r = 1=. Private agents
cannot buy external bonds directly, so the domestic interest rate is determined in
the domestic bond market. Equilibrium in this market is:
Bt+1 = At+1   Lt+1: (11)
In the presence of capital controls, only the central bank has access to external
11assets, so it has a monopoly over the supply of bonds to domestic agents. It
can therefore manipulate the domestic interest rate rt+1 by appropriately setting
the supply of bonds B. The possibility of accumulating reserves B enables the
central bank to change the domestic supply of bonds by simply expanding its
balance sheet. The central bank can then match the desired domestic saving by
accumulating reserves.
When the central bank policy creates a wedge between rt+1 and r, this gen-
erates revenues or losses. We assume that the central bank transfers directly its
prots t to households.14 The central bank budget constraint is:
B

t+1 + rtBt + t = r
B

t + Bt+1: (12)
We impose the usual no-ponzi condition to the central bank net asset position:
lim
T!1
B
T   BT
(r)T = 0: (13)
In general, prots ftgt0 have to satisfy the sequence of budget constraints (12)
and the no-ponzi condition (13) given the policy fBt+1;B
t+1gt0. In the following,
we focus on the realistic case where the central bank transfers its revenues or losses
to households on a period-by-period basis:
t = (r
   1)B

t   (rt   1)Bt : (14)
With this assumption, a change in international reserves has to be matched by an
14In practice, central banks usually transer they prots to the government, which relaxes the
government budget constraint. In Bacchetta et al. (2013), we explicitly introduce the government
and distortionary taxes.
12increase in the supply of bonds: B
t+1  B
t = Bt+1  Bt. Assuming that B
0 = B0,
we have:
B

t = Bt: (15)
This implies that the central bank is neither a net saver nor a net borrower.15
Notice that the closed economy and the open economy are special cases nested
in our semi-open economy framework. The central bank can always choose to
\replicate" the open economy by supplying the domestic market with bonds at
the world interest rate rt+1 = r. It can also mimic the closed economy by not
buying reserves: B
t+1 = 0. By choosing the level of reserves, the central bank also
chooses both the capital account policy and the exchange rate policy, as the level
of B both determines the level of domestic interest rate and the real exchange
rate p.
As a Ramsey planner, the central bank will choose a policy fBt+1;B
t+1gt0 to
maximize its social objective:
1 X
s=0

s 
u(c
AT
s ;c
AN
s ) + u(c
LT
s ;c
LN
s ))

: (16)
We will then analyze the optimal exchange rate policy in this context. If the
optimal policy replicates the open economy, then capital controls are unnecessary.
But if the optimal policy diers from the open economy, it means that capital
controls are welfare-improving. Notice, however, that optimal policies are not
necessarily Pareto optimal, as one of the groups may have a lower welfare.
15This is an important assumption since this prevents the central bank from borrowing from
the rest of the world and distribute resources to the households in order to overcome the borrowing
constraints. It is however realistic since most central banks distribute prots on an annual basis
(this is similar to the assumption made in many models that rms distribute all their prots
every period).
133 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we examine the properties of a competitive equilibrium for a
given policy. First, we describe how the reserve policy is equivalent to an exchange
rate policy and how it aects the bond market. Then, we analyze the steady state
and determine the conditions under which the economy is constrained.
We dene a competitive equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Given endowment streams
fY T
t ;Y N
t gt0 and initial conditions r0;A0;L0;B0;B
0 with B0 = A0   L0, a
competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices fpt;rt+1gt0 and Lagrange mul-
tipliers ft+1gt0, an allocation fAt+1;Lt+1;cAT
t ;cLT
t ;cAN
t ;cLN
t gt0, and a policy
ft;Bt+1;B
t+1gt0 such that: (i) given the price system and the policy, the
allocation and the Lagrange multipliers solve the households' problems (equations
(2){(7 ) are satised); (ii) given the allocation and the price system, the policy
satises the sequence of central bank budget constraints (12) and the no-ponzi
condition (13); (iii) the markets for non-traded goods (9) and domestic bonds
(11) clear.
As explained earlier, we will restrict the analysis to the subset of policies dened
by the prot distribution rule (14) and assume that B
0 = B0 so that the holding
of reserves equals the supply of bonds by the central bank (15).
143.1 Central Bank Policy, the Real Exchange Rate, and the
Real Interest Rate
With separable iso-elastic utility, intratemporal optimization by households
implies that the real exchange rate depends on the aggregate consumption of traded
goods as shown by equation (10). Using the budget constraints (2), (3) and (12)
together with the market-clearing conditions (9) and (11), we can derive a current
account identity:
B

t+1   B

t = (1 + a)Y
T
t + (r
   1)B

t   (c
AT
t + c
LT
t ): (17)
Substituting equation (17) into (10), we clearly see how choosing the increase in
reserves B
t+1   B
t is equivalent to setting the real exchange rate pt:
pt = 

(1 + a)Y T
t + (r   1)B
t   (B
t+1   B
t)
(1 + a)Y N
t

: (18)
By buying more reserves, and issuing the corresponding amount of domestic
bonds, the central bank can depreciate the real exchange rate, as explained in
Jeanne (2012): in the semi-open economy, reserve policy and exchange rate policy
are equivalent.
While accumulating more reserves during the transition, i.e., choosing a higher
ow B
t+1   B
t, depreciates the real exchange rate, a larger stock of reserves in
the steady state appreciates the real exchange rate if r > 1, as it makes domestic
agents richer and increase their demand for non-traded goods. In the steady state,
15equation (18) can indeed be rewritten as
p = 

Y T
Y N + (r
   1)
B
(1 + a)Y N

:
The exchange rate policy also has an eect on the domestic bond market and
the domestic interest rate. Since the stock of reserves is equal to the supply
of domestic bonds by the central bank, depreciating the exchange rate requires
increasing the supply of bonds. This leads to a higher domestic interest rate. Such
a policy might be desirable when borrowing constraints are binding.
To see this, consider the demand for assets by savers in the case of log utility
( = 1) where we can get closed-form solutions:16
At+1 =
1
1 + 

(Yt   rtLt + t=2)  
aYt+1 + t+1=2
rt+1
 
Lt+2
rt+1

: (19)
The eect of a binding borrowing constraint is to decrease future borrowing Lt+2,
which leads to a larger demand for saving instruments At+1. At the same time, a
binding borrowing constraint also decreases current borrowing by cash-poor house-
holds Lt+1, as implied by (7) when it holds as an equality. Absent any policy inter-
vention, the excess demand for and the constrained supply of bonds by the private
sector would lead to an abnormally low interest rate rt+1 to clear the market,
compared with a frictionless economy. By providing more bonds to the domestic
market, a policy of real exchange rate depreciation can alleviate the limited sup-
ply of bonds by cash-poor households and accommodate the need for saving by
cash-rich households.
16This equation follows from the Euler equation (5) and the budget constraints (2) and (3).
163.2 Symmetric Steady States
How central bank policy can alleviate borrowing constraints by providing do-
mestic bonds can be analyzed precisely in deterministic symmetric steady states,
dened as follows.
Denition 2 (Symmetric Steady State) Consider a constant endowment
stream (Y T
t ;Y N
t ) = (Y T;Y N) for t  0. A symmetric steady state is a constant
price vector (p;r), Lagrange multiplier , allocation (A;L;cAT;cLT;cAN;cLN), and
policy (;B;B) that form a competitive equilibrium associated to the endowment
stream (Y T;Y N) and the initial conditions r;A;L;B;B.
In a symmetric steady state, endowments and consumptions of a given indi-
vidual can still uctuate through time; but their distributions across agents are
stationary. Such a steady state is symmetric in the sense that all individuals have
the same state-contingent consumption and wealth.
The next step is to determine when the economy is constrained in the steady
state. Dene the following parameter  b:
 b =
(1 + )
 
1 a
1+   2

1  
(1 )
1+a
 
1 a
1+   2
:
The denominator of  b is strictly positive when  <
1+
1 
1 a
1+a, a weak condition which
we assume throughout.17
The following proposition shows that the steady states of the model depend on
how the amount of bonds B=Y T compares to  b.
17For example, with log-utility and  = 0:95, this condition holds as long as tradable con-
sumption represents at least 2.5% of total consumption.
17Proposition 1 Assume the prot distribution (14), with B0 = B
0 and log utility.
For all (Y T;Y N;B) 2 <+2  <+, there is a unique symmetric steady state.
If B
Y T <  b, the credit constraint is binding, the interest rate r < r increases
with B
Y T and the ratio of relative traded consumption is given by cLT
cAT = r=r < 1.
If on the contrary B
Y T   b, the credit constraint does not bind and r = r.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The proposition shows how the accumulation of reserves, or equivalently the
issuance of domestic bonds, determines the extent to which households can smooth
consumption despite the borrowing constraint. A higher level of reserves B and
domestic bonds B means that cash-rich households can save more and receive a
larger return on their saving, resulting in smaller uctuations of tradable consump-
tion through time. When the supply of bonds is large enough, cash-rich households
can accumulate enough assets to completely overcome their borrowing constraint
and perfectly smooth consumption.
A direct corollary of Proposition 1 is that the borrowing constraint never binds
in a steady state of the open economy and that the net foreign asset position of an
open economy, B, is necessarily larger than  bY T in a steady state. For stringent
enough borrowing constraints (i.e., low enough ),  b is positive, and the open
economy has positive net foreign assets in the steady state.
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4.1 The Ramsey Problem
To analyze optimal policy we now turn to the optimization problem of the
Ramsey planner. We consider the log utility case. Without loss of generality, we
assume zero initial net assets (B
0  B0 = 0). The planner maximizes its objective
(16) subject to the household budget constraints, their rst order conditions, the
borrowing constraint, the complementary slackness condition, the market-clearing
conditions for bonds, and the resource constraint for both non-tradable goods
(given by the market-clearing condition (9)) and tradable goods (given by the
current account identity (17)).18 Using the optimality conditions, the value of
non-tradable consumption in terms of tradables is suppressed from the Ramsey
program, namely ptcAN
t = cAT
t and ptcLN
t = cLT
t .
Maximization is then carried out with respect to
fLt+1;At+1;cAT
t ;cLT
t ;rt+1;pt;t+1;t;B
tgt0. The Lagrangian of the Ramsey
18Given the household budget constraints and the market-clearing conditions, the current
account identity is equivalent to the bugdet constraint of the central bank.
19problem in the semi-open economy is then dened as follows:
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:
The planner takes as constraints both the borrowing constraint (which does not
necessarily bind) and the complementary slackness condition, which both enter in
the denition of the competitive equilibrium. It is useful to dene t =  t +tt.
When the borrowing constraint does not bind, we have t = 0.
While the full solution to this dynamic optimization has to be solved numer-
ically, some interesting properties can be derived analytically. In particular, the
steady state can be fully characterized. As regards transition dynamics, one can
ask whether the planner wants to deviate from the closed economy regime char-
acterized by B = 0 and a constant real exchange rate. One can also determine
whether the planner wants to deviate from the open economy regime with r = r.
20We analyze these cases in the rest of this section and turn to full numerical solu-
tions in Section 5.
4.2 Optimal Level of Reserves in the Steady State
To study the optimal accumulation of reserves, we focus on the rst order
condition with respect to B
t+1:
 (
G
t   
G
t+1) + 
B
t = 0:
Using the other FOCs of the planner's program, we can replace B
t to get (see
Appendix A.2 for details):
 (
G
t   
G
t+1) + rt+1
t+1
2
= 0: (20)
The rst term reects the usual motive of intertemporal smoothing. The Lagrange
multiplier G is the shadow cost of the resource constraint for tradable goods.
When the tradable endowment is growing, this multiplier should decrease over
time in the absence of policy intervention (i.e., in a closed economy with B
t = 0),
making the rst term negative. This rst eect makes the planner want to borrow
abroad and appreciate the real exchange rate. The second term captures the eect
of the borrowing constraint. With a binding borrowing constraint, the planner
wants to accumulate reserves and depreciate the exchange rate. The optimal
policy balances those two eects.
When the borrowing constraint does not bind, both terms are equal to zero and
borrowing abroad allows the planner to get a constant shadow cost G and achieve
21perfect intertemporal smoothing. A binding borrowing constraint provides a mo-
tive to borrow less than in a frictionless economy, and to potentially accumulate
reserves.
This can be seen clearly in a steady state. Then, the rst term disappears and
equation (20) simply becomes  = 0. The steady state optimal policy consists
in completely relaxing borrowing constraints. Using Proposition 1, we can then
characterize the optimal level of reserves in a steady state.
Proposition 2 A steady state with optimal central bank policy is identical to an
open economy. It has positive foreign reserves when 2(1 + ) < 1   a.
Proof. From equation (20) taken in the steady state, we have  = 0. Therefore,
the borrowing constraint does not bind in the steady state. From Proposition 1,
this implies r = r so that this steady state is identical to an open economy. It
also implies B   bY T. Given our assumption that  <
1+
1 
1 a
1+a, the condition
2(1 + ) < 1   a implies  b > 0 and therefore B > 0.
4.3 Transition Dynamics
Consider now the case of transitory dynamics where endowments of both
tradable and non-tradable goods grow at the rate gt: Y T
t+1 = (1 + gt+1)Y T
t and
Y N
t+1 = (1+gt+1)Y N
t . Assume that a(1+gt+1) < 1 so that endowments still decline
for cash-poor households.
4.3.1 Comparing with the Closed Economy
To study the optimal reserve policy, we consider the closed economy and deter-
mine whether the planner wants to deviate from it. Denote by ~ Jt+1 the left-hand
22side of (20) evaluated in the closed economy with Bt = Bt+1 = 0. In general,
any deviation of ~ Jt+1 from zero means that the central bank can improve welfare
by changing the level of reserves and the real exchange rate. When ~ Jt+1 is posi-
tive, social welfare can be increased by buying reserves and depreciating the real
exchange rate below its value in the closed economy.
The expression for ~ Jt+1 can be solved explicitly in the case of a full borrowing
constraint  = 0.19 In Appendix A.3, we show that ~ Jt+1 is then given by:
~ Jt+1 =
1 + a
2aY T
t+1

1  
~ rt+1
r

: (21)
where ~ rt+1 is the closed-economy interest rate. The planner nds it socially optimal
to accumulate reserves and depreciate the real exchange rate during the transitory
dynamics, when the closed economy interest rate is strictly lower than the world
interest rate.
It easy to see that ~ rt+1 < r under our assumption a(1 + gt+1) < 1. Using
the fact that t = 0 in the closed economy, the demand for bonds by savers (19)
becomes
At+1 =
1
1 + 

Yt  
a(1 + gt+1)Yt
~ rt+1

:
Market clearing on the bond market implies At+1 = 0 so that the closed-economy
interest rate ~ rt+1 is given by ~ rt+1 = a(1+gt+1). Since r = 1=, we have ~ rt+1 < r,
so that reserve accumulation and currency depreciation are optimal when starting
from the closed economy.
19From Proposition 2, we already know that it is optimal to accumulate reserves in the steady
state when  = 0.
234.3.2 Comparing with the Open Economy
So far, we have shown that it is optimal to reproduce the open economy in
the steady state and to accumulate reserves if one starts from a closed economy
with tight borrowing constraints. An interesting question is whether the optimal
reserve policy consists in simply replicating the open economy.
To answer this question, we evaluate the left-hand side of (20) at rt+1 = r.
Let us denote this expression by J
t+1. Any deviation of J
t+1 from zero means that
the open economy is suboptimal and that the central bank can improve welfare by
accumulating (or decumulating) reserves with respect to the open economy. When
J
t+1 is positive, social welfare can be increased by accumulating more reserves than
the open economy. We obtain the following:
J
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(22)
with Lagrange multipliers of savers' budget constraints given by A
t =  L
t =
P
s1( 1)s t+s
2 (see appendix A.4).
In the steady state, J
t+1 converges to zero as  goes to zero and the consump-
tion of tradables converges to its steady-state level. This conrms that an open
economy in the steady state is at the Ramsey optimum. However, in the transition,
24the open economy could deviate from the optimum. To interpret condition (22), it
is useful to notice that a change in reserves aects welfare through two channels:
movements in the real interest rate and movements in the real exchange rate. The
rst line of equation (22), terms R1, R2, and R3, corresponds to the interest rate
channel. It arises whether there are nontradable goods in the economy or not (and
is also present in Bacchetta et al., 2013). The second line (terms P1, P2, P3, P 0
1,
P 0
2, P 0
3,) corresponds to the real exchange rate channel and disappears if  = 0.
Consider the rst line. An increase (decrease) in reserves leads to a higher
(lower) interest rate than in the open economy. Changes in the interest rate then
aect the utility of both cash-rich and cash-poor agents. The rst term (R1)
corresponds to the net eect of the interest rate on savers and is positive, as they
benet from higher returns on saving, which alleviates their future constraints.
The second term (R2) corresponds to the net eect on borrowers. This term
is negative because a high interest rate hurts the borrowing households through
higher interest payments, which makes both their current and future constraints
more stringent. The third term (R3) corresponds to the eect of central bank
prots. Indeed, if A > L and r > r, the interest payments on domestic debt are
higher than the proceeds from external reserves, so that central bank prots are
negative and households need to pay a lump sum tax to balance the budget. This
rst line can be both negative or positive depending on whether R1 is greater than
R2 + R3. Bacchetta et al. (2013) study this trade-o in detail and show under
what conditions the planner wants to increase (decrease) the interest rate above
(below) the world level. In particular, they show that the sum of those three terms
is positive when households' saving A is high and their borrowing L is low. In that
case, a higher interest rate today increases aggregate welfare by making transfers
25to savers, which they receive tomorrow when they become borrowers, without too
much directly hurting borrowers today.
Consider now the second line, which reects the real exchange rate conse-
quences of changing the level of reserves: an increase in reserves depresses the
current real exchange rate (terms P1, P2, P3) but increases the future consump-
tion of tradable goods and appreciates the future real exchange rate (terms P 0
1, P 0
2,
P 0
3).
The terms P1 and P 0
1 capture the eect of the real exchange rate on household
income. A more appreciated real exchange rate today increases the income of both
savers (A
t ) and borrowers (aL
t ), and vice versa in the following period. This is,
in principle, what the central bank would like to achieve given that households
are more constrained in early periods. This channel should lead to a decrease
in reserves in order to appreciate the currency. The terms P2 and P 0
2 represent
the eect of the collateral value: by appreciating the current real exchange rate,
the government makes the credit constraint less stringent, as long as creditors
admit a share  > 0 of non-tradable goods as collateral. On the other hand,
a more depreciated future real exchange rate worsens future constraints. This
channel, as well, should lead to a decrease in reserves. Finally, the terms P3 and
P 0
3 capture the eect of the real exchange rate on consumption. A more depreciated
real exchange rate today lowers the price of non-tradable consumption and frees
resources for tradable consumption, which is valued at the marginal utility of
average consumption, [(cLT
t +cAT
t )=2] 1. The reverse is true for a more appreciated
real exchange rate tomorrow, taking into account the average shadow price of the
borrowing constraint t+1=2. These two terms, P3 and P 0
3, are similar to a Euler
equation for the planner. As for the interest rate channel, the consequences of this
26channel on reserve accumulation is ambiguous. It depends whether the economy
is in a situation where the central bank wants to encourage borrowing or saving.
To summarize, it is in general optimal to deviate from the open economy in
the transition due to several eects. The size and sign of the deviations is a
quantitative question that is examined in the next section.
5 Numerical Simulations of Optimal Policies
We examine the full solution to the Ramsey problem in two specic cases.
First, to illustrate the theoretical results in the previous section, we consider a
constrained closed economy and determine its optimal path to its unconstrained
steady state. Second, we analyze the optimal policy in a growth acceleration
episode similar to the one experienced by the Chinese economy.
5.1 Real Exchange Rate Dynamics in Opening-up
Economies
Consider a closed economy characterized by strong borrowing constraints:
2(1 + ) < 1   a. We know from Proposition 2 that in such a case, the steady
state optimal policy consists in accumulating enough reserves to completely over-
come the borrowing constraints. We illustrate this result numerically and examine
the whole dynamics of the optimal policy. We simulate a baseline case, with
 = 1=1:05 and  = 3, implying that non-tradables represent 75% of consumption
(as in Obstfeld and Rogo, 2000). We choose low values for both  and a to satisfy
the aforementioned condition:  = 0:1, a = 0. This corresponds to an economy
27with strong borrowing constraints and a high volatility of individual incomes. We
assume zero growth. For comparison purposes, we simulate the closed economy
and the open economy, along with the optimal semi-open economy.
These dynamics are represented in Figure 2 in deviations from the steady state.
Consider rst the dynamics of the open economy, represented by the dashed line.
In the long run, the economy converges to its unconstrained steady state with a
higher level of foreign assets, which gives households the means to smooth their
consumption of tradable goods. However, in the short-run, the economy does
not have enough foreign assets yet and is constrained. As a result of the sharp
increase in the interest rate, cash-poor households are less able to borrow and have
to decrease their consumption of tradables. Anticipating this, cash-rich households
cut on their tradable consumption in order to accumulate assets. Consequently,
the price of nontradable goods decreases on impact. As the economy accumulates
foreign assets, the consumption of tradable goods increases and there is a real
appreciation. In the long run, the real exchange rate is slightly higher than in
the closed economy steady state because the consumption of tradables is higher
thanks to the positive foreign asset position.
Consider now the dynamics of the optimal semi-open economy, represented by
the solid line. The economy converges to a similar unconstrained steady state with
positive reserves. This illustrates our result that ~ J > 0 for low . However, the
initial increase in reserves is stronger than in the open economy, so that the interest
rate initially jumps to a higher level than the world rate. This corresponds to the
case J > 0. As explained in Bacchetta et al. (2013), this happens in our baseline
calibration because, with stringent credit constraints, the government can achieve
a transfer to cash-poor agents, who have a high marginal utility, by increasing the
28interest rate. A higher interest rate indeed increases the return on savings, which
are part of cash-poor agents' income, without increasing interest payments too
much, as L is low. This corresponds to the interest rate channel described in the
rst line of Equation (22). Adding a real exchange rate channel does not reverse
this prediction.
Overall, the utility gain of moving from a closed to a semi-open economy is
quite substantial. When switching to a semi-open economy, households gain the
equivalent of 7.4% of their consumption under a closed economy.20
5.2 Real Exchange Rate Dynamics in Catching-up
Economies
We now turn to the case of a growing economy. We assume that the econ-
omy experiences persistent growth but converges to a stationary steady state:
gt+1 = gt. This corresponds to a catching-up economy. Importantly, tradable
and nontradable endowments grow at the same rate.
5.2.1 Baseline simulation
We consider the same baseline case as before, with  = 3,  = 0:1 and a = 0,
and choose  = 0:9. We start from a symmetric steady state at t = 0, where agents
are marginally unconstrained. That is, we assume that B
0 =  bY T
0 . At t = 1, the
economy is hit by a positive growth shock g1 = 10%.
The optimal semi-open economy dynamics are presented in Figure 3. Before
20This holds under the veil of ignorance, that is if the households did not know whether they
would switch to a semi-open economy when they are borrowers or when they are savers. However,
both borrowers and savers would agree to switch, as they respectively gain the equivalent of 7.5%
and 7.3% of their consumption under the closed economy.
29the shock hits, borrowing constraints are just at the limit of binding. When the
shock hits, agents now expect persistent growth and want to borrow more from
their future income. This makes their borrowing constraint strictly binding in their
cash-poor periods. Anticipating this, they accumulate assets A in their cash-rich
periods. This accumulation is made possible by an increase in B and thus in net
foreign assets B. As in the previous simulation, the increase in B is so strong
that the domestic interest rate rt rises above r, as discussed above.
It is interesting to consider the real exchange rate implications of such a pol-
icy. As the consumption of tradable goods is initially depressed relatively to the
consumption of nontradables due to the accumulation of foreign assets, there is an
initial depreciation. However, as the accumulation of foreign assets increases the
tradable revenues of the economy relative to nontradables, the real exchange rate
starts appreciating after a few periods. Our model therefore features an appre-
ciating currency in catching-up economies, similar to a Balassa-Samuelson eect.
But contrary to the Balassa-Samuelson eect, this appreciation is not generated
by TFP catch-up in the tradable sector (we assume the same growth rate in both
sectors) but by credit constraints.
In order to assess the role of policy, we compare the dynamics of the real
exchange rate in the optimal semi-open economy and in the open economy, both
in the baseline calibration. The results are represented in panel (a) of Figure 4.
The real exchange rate has a similar behavior in the open and semi-open economy.
This suggests that the initial depreciation as well as the subsequent appreciation
are natural outcomes of a growth acceleration in a credit-constrained economy
and would occur without policy intervention. The only dierence is that, in the
optimal semi-open economy, the real exchange rate is slightly less depreciated as
30the government is able to somewhat alleviate the credit constraints. But this is
the case only after a few periods, as in the beginning the government accumulates
more foreign assets than in the open economy, which depresses the consumption
of tradables and depreciates the real exchange rate.
5.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
To further assess the role of credit constraints, we compare these dynamics
to those obtained when the agents can pledge a larger share of their income as
collateral. We consider the case where  = 0:28, which is represented in panel (b)
of Figure 4. Here  is large enough for the economy to be in an initial negative
foreign asset position, but is still small enough for the credit constraints to be
binding. The dynamics of the real exchange rate are now reversed: the country
experiences rst an appreciation and then a depreciation. Indeed, agents are now
able to better smooth their consumption of tradables, which is impossible for
nontradables by denition. As a result, they initially consume relatively more
tradables than nontradables, hence the initial real appreciation. In the optimal
semi-open economy, the real exchange rate appreciates even more initially. This
is because the optimal policy with large  consists in maintaining a relatively low
domestic interest rate in order to make transfers to agents and alleviate the credit
constraint of borrowers. This implies that the central bank accumulates fewer
reserves than in the open economy, which stimulates the consumption of tradables
and appreciates further the currency.
Notice that the dierence between the open economy and the semi-open econ-
omy is more substantial in the case  = 0:28 than in the case  = 0:1. This is
due to the collateral and income channels described in Section 4.3.2. Those two
31channels create an incentive to appreciate the currency. This reinforces the relative
appreciation observed in the optimal semi-open economy with high  and miti-
gates the relative depreciation observed in the optimal semi-open economy with
low .
As sensitivity checks we consider the cases with a less persistent growth episode,
 = 0:75, and a smaller income variability with a = 0:2. These cases are repre-
sented in panel (c) of Figure 4. The dynamics of p are similar to the baseline in
both cases, except that the initial depreciation is smaller and shorter. Indeed, with
less persistent growth and with smaller income variability, the constraints are less
binding, which mitigates the initial depreciation.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the literature has highlighted the role of
pecuniary externalities through the collateral value in order to justify the use of
capital controls or, equivalently, of real exchange rate manipulation. This motive
is present in our model. It is represented by the terms P2 and P 0
2 in the second
line of Equation (22). It reects the desire of the central bank to appreciate the
real exchange rate in order to inate the value of the collateral and relax the
constraint. In order to assess the role of this eect, we distinguish between the
share of tradable and nontradable goods that can be used as collateral (e.g., as in
Bianchi, 2011), i.e.,
rt+2Lt+2  
TY
T
t+2 + 
Npt+2Y
N
t+2: (23)
This pecuniary externality arises only through N. We therefore set T to zero and
set N = 0:28(1 + )= so that agents face the same \average" credit constraint
as in the case with larger , represented in panel (b) of Figure 4. We choose the
simulation with larger  as a benchmark, rather than the baseline, to give some
32scope for the pecuniary externality. Indeed, with  close to zero, this externality
vanishes. Also, the economy in the case with larger  is a net debtor, as is usual in
the literature on pecuniary externalities. The results are represented in panel (d)
of Figure 4. The dynamics of the real exchange rate are almost identical to the
case where T and N are equal, which shows that the collateral value motive is
dominated by the other motives for reserve accumulation.
In the baseline case, we assume that growth aects both the tradable and the
nontradable sector. In panel (e), we represent the case where growth occurs only
in the tradable sector, which is also the assumption made in Balassa-Samuelson.
In that case, there is a clear appreciation trend in the currency. Again, this is due
to the credit constraint as the consumption of tradable goods is tightly dependent
on the endowment. Besides, as the consumption of tradables increases relatively
to nontradables, there is no initial depreciation. However, the real exchange rate is
still relatively depreciated as compared to an economy without constraint. Indeed,
without constraint, the consumption of tradable goods and thus the real exchange
rate would adjust immediately to their long-run level.
Empirically, both the tradable and non-tradable sectors grew at a high rate in
China during the years 2000. The tradable sector, dened as manufacturing and
agriculture, grew at an average rate of 8.6 log-points per year in real terms between
2000 and 2010, compared to 10.2 log-points for manufacturing alone. During the
same period the non-tradable sector, dened as services and non-manufacturing
industry, grew at the slightly higher rate of 11 log-points.21 Hence, our baseline
case of homogeneous growth across sectors seems to be a reasonable approximation
of the Chinese dynamics.
21Authors' calculation based on the World Development Indicators from the World Bank.
33Finally, in panel (f), we represent the eect of parameters related to real ex-
change rate determination. Namely, we consider the case with a stronger prefer-
ence for nontradables,  = 4 and the case with a lower elasticity of substitution
between tradable and nontradable goods, that is, with  = 1:75. Qualitatively,
the dynamics of the real exchange rate with a larger  or with a larger  is similar
to the baseline case. Quantitatively, the initial depreciation is stronger. This is
because both a stronger preference for nontradable goods and a lower degree of
substitutability make the real exchange rate more sensitive to changes in tradable
and nontradable consumption.22
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined the optimal exchange rate policy in an economy with
strong capital controls and tight credit constraints. On the one hand, we found
it optimal to reproduce an unconstrained and open economy in the long run. On
the other hand, the optimal policy in transitions is more complex, in particular
due to agents heterogeneity. However, in the case of growth acceleration, the
dierence between the evolution of the real exchange rate in the optimal policy
and in the open economy was found to be small. In other words the optimal
22As apparent in the graph, the real exchange rate might exhibit some mild oscillations. This
is due to heterogeneity: the motive for changing the real exchange rate can uctuate over time
as the agent with higher marginal utility switches from borrower to saver. This is the case in the
simulation with a higher , where the real exchange rate initially depreciates before appreciating
again. Initially, the planner accumulates reserves in order to maintain a high interest rate, which
benets the initial saver (this is captured by R1) at the expense of the initial borrower (this
is captured by R2 and R3). Because  is larger, this however depreciates the currency even
more than in the baseline simulation, which hurts the initial borrower further by decreasing
revenues and making the constraint more stringent (these eects are summarized by P1 and P2
respectively). The following appreciation compensates for that by stimulating the next period's
revenues of the initial borrower (P0
1 term).
34exchange rate policy is close to reproduce the open economy. In an open economy,
an increase in growth would lead to an increase in aggregate saving when credit
constraints are tight. This would lead to an initial capital outow with a currency
depreciation. Over time, however, saving and capital outow would decline and
the currency would appreciate. This gradual appreciation in a growing economy is
not caused by sectoral growth dierentials as with the Balassa-Samuelson eect,
but by declining saving rates. The optimal policy should broadly accommodate
these real exchange rate dynamics.
The analysis has focused on real exchange rate adjustments in the context of
sustained structural shocks, thereby taking a longer run perspective. There are
several interesting aspects that we have left aside. For example, what would be
the role of the exchange rate regime. On this topic, Aghion et al. (2009) would
suggest that a xed exchange rate can deliver a higher productivity growth in a
context of low nancial development. Another interesting question would be the
optimal policy in the case of domestic nancial liberalization.
Finally, the paper has studied central bank policy considering scal develop-
ments as given. But several scal measures could potentially alleviate the need for
saving instruments. For example, investment in public infrastructure could pro-
vide additional saving instruments to the private sector and decrease the need for
reserve accumulation by the central bank. In recent years, the Chinese government
has actually engaged in such a plan of large investments and international reserves
at the central bank have started to decline.
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38A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equations (5) and (6), taken in the steady state, imply that (r)2(1 + ) = 1.
Since   0, it follows that r  1. Therefore, we look for an equilibrium interest
rate r 2 (0;r].
Assume rst that the borrowing constraint (4) is binding. Then, using the
demand for bonds (19) and the fact that B
t = Bt, the market-clearing condition
for bonds (11), taken in the steady state, can be rewritten:
B
 +
Y
r
=
1
1 + 

[(1   )Y + =2]  
aY + =2
r
 
Y
r2

:
From the prot distribution (14), we have  = (r   r)B = (1=   r)B. Then,
1=r is the solution of a third-degree polynomial: P(1=r) = 0, with
P(X) = 
Y
Y T X
3+

[a+(1+)]
Y
Y T +
B
2Y T

X
2 

(1 )
Y
Y T  B


X+
B
2Y T
where Y=Y T can be derived from equation (18):
Y=Y
T = 1 + pY
N=Y
T = 1 +  +

1 + a
1   

B
Y T :
We have P(0)  0 for B  0. In addition, P() = P(1=r) < 0 if and only if

1  
(1   )
1 + a
1   a
1 + 
  2

B
 < (1 + )Y
T
1   a
1 + 
  2

:
This condition is equivalent to B=Y T <  b when the left-hand side is strictly
39positive, which we have assumed. Finally, P(X) ! +1 when X ! +1 and
P(X) !  1 when X !  1. It follows that P has three roots: one negative
root, one root on (0;), and one root on (;+1). Since, the equilibrium interest
rate has to be in (0;r], we must have X   so that we can discard the rst two
roots. We conclude that there is a unique interest rate r 2 (0;r] that clears the
market for bonds and that this interest rate is strictly lower than r. Given r, it
is straightforward to derive all the other variables in the steady state.
The interest rate r is an increasing function of B=Y T. To see this, compute the
derivative dP=d(B=Y T) evaluated at the root  X. It has the sign of  ( B
2Y T  X2 +
 B
Y T  X +  B
2Y T ) < 0. Since P is increasing around  X, then  X is a decreasing
function of B=Y T. Therefore, r = 1=  X increases with B=Y T.
Finally, the ratio of related traded consumption cLT=cAT is given by the rst-
order condition (5) and is equal to r = r=r < 1.
Assume now that the borrowing constraint does not bind. From the rst-order
conditions (5) and (6) when  = 0, we must have r = 1 in any symmetric steady
state, i.e., r = r. Then, it is easy to compute all the other variables in the
steady state, to check that the borrowing constraint indeed does not bind, and
that B=Y T   b.
40A.2 Derivation of Equation (20)
The rst-order conditions with respect to At+1, Lt+1, and t are:
FOC(At+1) 
A
t + 
B
t = rt+1
L
t+1;
FOC(Lt+1) 
L
t + 
B
t = rt+1(
A
t+1 + t+1);
FOC(t) 
A
t + 
L
t = 0:
The sum of the rst-order conditions with respect to At+1 and Lt+1, together with
the last one, gives B
t = rt+1t+1=2. This proves equation (20).
The dierence of the rst-order conditions with respect to At+1 and Lt+1 gives

A
t   
L
t =  rt+1(
A
t+1   
L
t+1 + t+1): (24)
A.3 Derivation of Equation (21)
From the rst-order condition with respect to t+1, we have: L
t rt+1v0(cAT
t+1) =
t+1[(Y T
t+1 + pt+1Y N
t+1)   rt+1Lt+1] from which we can deduce that L
t = 0.
Consider the rst-order conditions with respect to cAT
t
1 + 
cAT
t
  (1 + )
A
t   
G
t   
N
t  
A
t
(cAT
t )2 = 0; (25)
and with respect to cLT
t
1 + 
cLT
t
  (1 + )
L
t   
G
t   
N
t +
A
t 1rt
(cLT
t )2 = 0: (26)
To get an expression for G
t , we rst need to compute A
t , L
t , N
t , and A
t .
41The rst-order condition with respect to rt+1 is
A
t
cLT
t+1
= 
L
t+1At+1   (
A
t+1 + t+1)Lt+1: (27)
In the closed economy, we have At+1 = Lt+1. If in addition  = 0, we get At+1 =
Lt+1 = 0, so that A
t = 0.
The Lagrange multiplier N
t is given by the rst-order condition with respect
to pt, together with (10):

N
t =
2
cAT
t + cLT
t
 
A
t + aL
t
1 + a
 
t
1 + a
: (28)
Finally, from the rst-order conditions (25) and (26), together with the Euler
equation (6), we can show that t = t=cAT
t+1.
We can now evaluate G
t and t in the closed economy with  = 0. In this
case, we have At+1 = Lt+1 = B
t+1 = 0 and therefore t = 0. From the current
account identity (17), and the budget constraints (2) and (3), we get cAT
t = Y T
t
and cLT
t = aY T
t . The Euler equation (5) implies that rt+1 = a(1 + gt+1). From
(6), we get t+1 = 1
a2   1. Therefore, t =
 
1
a2   1

1
Y T
t . Then, we can iterate
equation (24) forward to get A
t =  L
t =   1 a
2aY T
t . From (28), we get N
t = 1+a
2aY T
t .
Then, (25) yields G
t = 1+a
2aY T
t . Therefore,
~ Jt+1 = 
G
t+1   
G
t + rt+1
t+1
2
=
1 + a
2aY T
t
[(1 + gt+1)
 1   1] +
a(1 + gt+1)(1   a2)
2a2Y T
t+1
;
which yields equation (21).
42A.4 Derivation of Equation (22)
By denition, J is the left-hand side of Equation (20), evaluated at rt+1 =
r = 1=, so we have:
J

t+1 =  (
G
t   
G
t+1) +
t+1
2
: (29)
Subtracting equation (26) at t+1 from (25) at t, and using the fact that cAT
t = cLT
t+1
in the open economy, we obtain:

G
t   
G
t+1 = (1 + )(
L
t+1   
A
t ) + (
N
t+1   
N
t )  
1 + 

A
t
(cAT
t )2: (30)
By iterating (24) forward when rt+1 = 1, and given that A
t =  L
t , we get
A
t =  L
t =
P
s1( 1)s t+s
2 . Then, equation (27) in the open economy can be
rewritten:
A
t
(cAT
t )2 =
1
cAT
t
" 
1 X
i=1
t+2i
!
At+1  
 
1 X
i=0
t+1+2i
!
Lt+1  
1
2
 
1 X
i=1
t+1+i
!
(At+1   Lt+1)
#
:
(31)
Injecting (28) and (31) in (30), and replacing G
t  G
t+1 in Equation (29), we obtain
Equation (22).
43Figure 1: Stylized facts in the Chinese economy
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Note: the vertical line indicates the date at which China joined the World Trade
Organization (December 2001). An increase in the index of real eective exchange
rate corresponds to an appreciation.
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44Figure 2: Optimal policy in a closed economy
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Note: We assume that the economy starts at the closed economy steady state.
At t = 1, the economy either stays in the closed economy (\closed economy"),
switches to an open economy (\open economy"), or switches to an optimal semi-
open economy (\semi-open economy"). All variables are in deviations from the
initial steady state, except B and r, which are in levels. The baseline calibration
simulated here is characterized by the following parameter values:  = 0:1, a = 0,
 = 3,  = 0:9 and  = 1 (log-utility).
45Figure 3: Optimal policy in a catching-up economy - Baseline
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Y
T, Y
N
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
r
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
p
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
B
*
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
A
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
L
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
c
AT
t
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
c
LT
t
Note: We assume that gt+1 = gt. At t = 1, the economy is hit by a growth shock
g1 = 10%. All variables are in deviations from the initial steady state, except r,
which in in level. The baseline calibration simulated here is characterized by the
following parameter values:  = 0:1, a = 0,  = 3,  = 0:9 and  = 1 (log-utility).
46Figure 4: Optimal evolution of the real exchange rate in a catching-up economy -
Sensitivity analysis
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